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Abstract
Many recent works have shown that adversarial examples that fool classifiers can be
found by minimally perturbing a normal input. Recent theoretical results, starting
with Gilmer et al. (2018b), show that if the inputs are drawn from a concentrated
metric probability space, then adversarial examples with small perturbation are
inevitable. A concentrated space has the property that any subset with Ω(1) (e.g.,
1/100) measure, according to the imposed distribution, has small distance to almost
all (e.g., 99/100) of the points in the space. It is not clear, however, whether these
theoretical results apply to actual distributions such as images. This paper presents
a method for empirically measuring and bounding the concentration of a concrete
dataset which is proven to converge to the actual concentration. We use it to
empirically estimate the intrinsic robustness to `∞ and `2 perturbations of several
image classification benchmarks.
1 Introduction
Despite achieving exceptionally high accuracy on natural inputs, state-of-the-art machine learning
models have been shown to be vulnerable to adversaries who use small perturbations to fool the
classifier (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015). This phenomenon, known as adversarial
examples, has motivated numerous studies (Papernot et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017; Biggio & Roli,
2018; Gilmer et al., 2018a) to develop heuristic defenses that aim to improve classifier robustness.
However, most defense mechanisms have been quickly broken by adaptive attacks (Carlini & Wagner,
2017; Athalye et al., 2018). Although certification methods (Raghunathan et al., 2018; Wong &
Kolter, 2018; Sinha et al., 2018; Wong et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2018) have been proposed aiming to
end such arms race and continuous efforts have been made to develop better robust models, both the
robustness guarantees and efficiency achieved by existing robust classifiers are far from satisfying.
The above-mentioned difficulties motivate a fundamental information-theoretic question: what are
the inherent limitations of developing robust classifiers? Several recent works (Gilmer et al., 2018b;
Fawzi et al., 2018; Mahloujifar et al., 2018; Shafahi et al., 2018) have shown that under certain
assumptions regarding the data distribution and the perturbation metric, adversarial examples are
theoretically inevitable. As a result, for a broad set of theoretically natural metric probability spaces
of inputs, there is no classifier for the data distribution that achieves adversarial robustness. For
example, Gilmer et al. (2018b) assumed that the input data are sampled uniformly from n-spheres and
proved a model-independent theoretical bound connecting the risk to the average Euclidean distance
to the “caps” (i.e., round regions on a sphere). Mahloujifar et al. (2018) generalized this result to any
concentrated metric probability space of inputs and showed, for example, that if the inputs come from
any Normal Lévy family (Lévy, 1951), any classifier with a noticable test error will be vulnerable to
small (i.e., sublinear in the typical norm of the inputs) perturbations.
∗Equal contribution.
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Although such theoretical findings seem discouraging to the goal of developing robust classifiers,
all these impossibility results depend on assumptions about data distributions that might not hold
for cases of interest. Our work develops a general method for testing properties of concrete datasets
against these theoretical assumptions.
Contributions. Our work shrinks the gap between theoretical analyses of robustness of classification
for theoretical data distributions and understanding the intrinsic robustness2 of actual datasets. Indeed,
quantitative estimates of the intrinsic robustness of benchmark image datasets such as MNIST and
CIFAR-10 can provide us with a better understanding of the threat of adversarial examples for natural
image distributions and may suggest promising directions for further improving classifier robustness.
Our main technical contribution is a general method to evaluate the concentration of a given input
distribution µ based on a set of data samples. We prove that by simultaneously increasing the sample
size m and a complexity parameter T , the concentration of the empirical measure converges to the
actual concentration of µ (Section 3).
Using our method, we perform experiments to demonstrate the existence of robust error regions for
benchmark datasets under both `∞ and `2 perturbations (Section 4). Compared with state-of-the-art
robustly trained models, our estimated intrinsic robustness shows that, for most settings, there exists
a large gap between the robust error achieved by the best current models and the theoretical limits
implied by concentration. This suggests the concentration of measure is not the only reason behind
the vulnerability of existing classifiers to adversarial perturbations. Thus, either there is room for
improving the robustness of image classifiers (even with non-zero classification error) or a need for
deeper understanding of the reasons for the gap between intrinsic robustness and the actual robustness
achieved by robust models, at least for the datasets like the image classification benchmarks used in
our experiments.
Related Work. We are aware of only one previous work that attempts to heuristically estimate these
properties. To extend their theoretical impossibility result to the practical distributions, Gilmer et al.
(2018b) studied MNIST dataset to find a region that is somewhat robust in terms of the expected
`2 distance of other images from the region. In their setting, they showed the existence of a set of
measure 0.01 with average `2 distance 6.59 to all points. In comparison, our work is the first to
provide a general methodology to empirically estimate the concentration of measure with provable
guarantees. Moreover, we are able to deal with `∞, and worst-case bounded perturbations for
modeling adversarial risk, which is the most popular setting for research in adversarial examples.
Another related line of work estimated lower bounds on the concentration of measure of the underlying
distribution through simulating distributions by generative models. Fawzi et al. (2018) proved a lower
bound on the concentration of the generated image distribution, assuming the underlying generative
model has Gaussian latent space and small Lipschitz constant. Krusinga et al. (2019) estimated
an upper bound on the density function of the distribution using generative model, then proved
concentration inequalities based on upper bounds on the density function. Our work is distinct from
these works, because we directly learn the concentration function instead of a lower bound, and we
use the actual data samples instead of samples generated from some trained generative model.
Notation. Lowercase boldface letters such as x are used to denote vectors, and [n] is used to represent
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Denote by xi the i-th entry of x. For any set A, let Pow(A), |A| and 1A(·) be the
power set of A3, cardinality and indicator function of A, respectively. For any x ∈ Rn, the `∞-norm
and `2-norm of x are defined as ‖x‖∞ = maxi∈[n] |xi| and ‖x‖2 = (
∑
i∈[n] x
2
i )
1/2 respectively. Let
(X , µ) be a probability space and d : X × X → R be some distance metric defined on X . Define the
empirical measure with respect to a set S sampled from µ as µˆS(A) =
∑
x∈S 1A(x)/|S|,∀A ⊆ X .
Let Ball(x, ) = {x′ ∈ X : d(x′,x) ≤ } be the ball around x with radius  ≥ 0. For any subset
A ⊆ X , define the -expansion A = {x ∈ X : ∃ x′ ∈ Ball(x, ) ∩ A}. The collection of the
-expansions for members of any G ⊆ Pow(X ) is defined and denoted as G = {A : A ∈ G}.
2See Definition 2.2 for the formal definition of intrinsic robustness. The term robustness has been used with
different meanings in previous works (e.g., in Diochnos et al. (2018), it refers to the average distances to the
error region). However, all such uses refer to a desirable property of the classifier in being resilient to adversarial
perturbations, which is the case here as well. See Diochnos et al. (2018) for a taxonomy of different definitions.
3Although this notation denotes the power set, we usually use it to denote the measurable subsets of A
according to a measure µ, when µ is clear from the context.
2
2 Adversarial Examples from Concentration of Measure
In this paper, we work with the following definition of adversarial risk:
Definition 2.1 (Adversarial Risk). Let (X , µ) be the probability space of instances and f∗ be the
underlying ground-truth. The adversarial risk of a classifier f in metric d with strength  is defined as
AdvRisk(f, f
∗) = Pr
x←µ
[∃ x′ ∈ Ball(x, ) s.t. f(x′) 6= f∗(x′)].
For  = 0, which allows no perturbation, the notion of adversarial risk coincides with traditional
risk.4 We define intrinsic robustness as the maximum achievable adversarial robustness:
Definition 2.2 (Intrinsic Robustness). Consider the same setting as in Definition 2.1. Let F be some
family of classifiers, then the intrinsic robustness is defined as the maximum adversarial robustness
that can be achieved within F , namely
Rob(F , f∗) = 1− inf
f∈F
{
AdvRisk(f, f
∗)
}
.
In this work, we specify F as the family of imperfect classifiers that have risk at least α ∈ (0, 1).
Previous work shows a connection between concentration of measure and the intrinsic robustness
with respect to some families of classifiers (Gilmer et al. (2018b); Fawzi et al. (2018); Mahloujifar
et al. (2018); Shafahi et al. (2018)). The concentration of measure on a metric probability space is
defined by a concentration function as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Concentration Function). Consider a metric probability space (X , µ, d). Suppose
 ≥ 0 and α ∈ [0, 1] are given parameters, then the concentration function of the probability measure
µ with respect to , α is defined as
h(µ, α, ) = inf
E∈Pow(X )
{
µ(E) : µ(E) ≥ α
}
.
Note that the standard notion of concentration function (e.g., see Talagrand (1995)) is related to a
special case of Definition 2.3 by fixing α = 1/2.
Generalizing the result of Gilmer et al. (2018b) about instances drawn from spheres, Mahloujifar
et al. (2018) showed that, in general, if the metric probability space of instances is concentrated, then
any classifier with 1% risk incurs large adversarial risk for small amount of perturbations.
Theorem 2.4 (Mahloujifar et al. (2018)). Let (X , µ) be the probability space of instances and f∗ be
the underlying ground-truth. For any classifier f , we have
AdvRisk(f, f
∗) ≥ h(µ,Risk(f, f∗), ).
In order for this theorem to be useful, we need to know the concentration function. The behavior of
this function is studied extensively for certain theoretical metric probability spaces (Ledoux, 2001;
Milman & Schechtman, 1986). However, it is not known how to measure the concentration function
for arbitrary metric probability spaces. In this work, we provide a framework to (algorithmically)
bound the concentration function from i.i.d. samples from a distribution. Namely, we want to solve
the following optimization task using our i.i.d. samples:
minimize
E∈Pow(X )
µ(E) subject to µ(E) ≥ α. (1)
We aim to estimate the minimum possible adversarial risk, which captures the intrinsic robustness
for classification in terms of the underlying distribution µ, conditioned on the fact that the original
risk is at least α. Note that solving this optimization problem only shows the possibility of existence
of an error region E with certain (small) expansion. This means that there could potentially exist a
classifier with risk at least α and adversarial risk equal to the solution of the optimization problem (1).
Actually finding such an optimally robust classifier (with error α) using a learning algorithm might
be a much more difficult task or even infeasible. We do not consider that problem in this work.
4This definition of adversarial risk is used in some previous works, including Gilmer et al. (2018b), Bubeck
et al. (2018), and Mahloujifar et al. (2018). Other related definitions (such as in Madry et al. (2017)) are
equivalent when we assume small perturbations preserve the ground truth.
3
3 Method for Measuring Concentration
In this section, we present a method to measure the concentration of measure on a metric probability
space using i.i.d. samples. To measure concentration, there are two main challenges:
1. Measuring concentration appears to require knowledge of the density function of the distri-
bution, but we only have a data set sampled from the distribution.
2. Even with the density function, we have to find the best possible subset among all the subsets
of the space, which seems infeasible.
We show how to overcome these two challenges to find the actual concentration in the limit by
first empirically simulating the distribution and then narrowing down our search space to a specific
carefully chosen collection of subsets. Our results show that for such a family of sets, the expansion
can be bounded using polynomially many samples, while the convergence to the actual concentration
(without the limits on the sets) happens in the limit T →∞, where T is the parameter related to the
complexity of the collection.
Before stating our main theorems, we introduce two useful definitions. The following definition
captures the concentration function for a specific collection of subsets.
Definition 3.1 (Concentration Function for a Collection of Subsets). Consider a metric probability
space (X , µ, d). Let  ≥ 0 and α ∈ [0, 1] be given parameters, then the concentration function of the
probability measure µ with respect to , α and a collection of subsets G ⊆ Pow(X ) is defined as
h(µ, α, ,G) = inf
E∈G
{
µ(E) : µ(E) ≥ α
}
.
When G = Pow(X ), we write h(µ, α, ) for simplicity.
We also need to define the notion of complexity penalty for a collection of subsets. The complexity
penalty for a collection of subsets captures the rate of the uniform convergence for the subsets in
that collection. One can get such uniform convergence rates using the VC dimension or Rademacher
complexity of the collection.
Definition 3.2 (Complexity Penalty). Let G ⊆ Pow(X ) be a collection of subsets of X . A function
φ : N× R→ [0, 1] is a complexity penalty for G iff for any probability measure µ supported on X
and any δ ∈ [0, 1], we have
Pr
S←µm
[∃ E ∈ G s.t. |µ(E)− µˆS(E)| ≥ δ] ≤ φ(m, δ).
Theorem 3.3 shows how to overcome the challenge of measuring concentration from finite samples,
when the concentration is defined with respect to specific families of subsets. Namely, it shows that
the empirical concentration is close to the true concentration, if the underlying collection of subsets
is not too complex. The proof of Theorem 3.3 is provided in Appendix A.1.
Theorem 3.3 (Generalization of Concentration). Let (X , µ, d) be a metric probability space and
G ⊆ Pow(X ). For any δ, α ∈ [0, 1] and  ≥ 0, we have
Pr
S←µm
[
h(µ, α−δ, ,G)−δ ≤ h(µˆS , α, ,G) ≤ h(µ, α+δ, ,G)+δ
] ≥ 1−2(φ(m, δ)+φ(m, δ)),
where φ and φ are complexity penalties for G and G respectively.
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.3 shows that if we narrow down our search to a collection of subsets G
such that both G and G have small complexity penalty, then we can use the empirical distribution to
measure concentration of measure for that specific collection. Note that the generalization bound of
Theorem 3.3 depends on complexity penalties for both G and G. Therefore, in order for this theorem
to be useful, the collection G must be chosen in a careful way. For example, if G has bounded VC
dimension, then G might still have a very large VC dimension. Alternatively, G might denote the
collection of subsets that are decidable by a neural network of a certain size. In that case, even though
there are well known complexity penalties for such collections (see Neyshabur et al. (2017)), the
complexity of their expansions is unknown. In fact, relating the complexity penalty for expansion of a
collection to that of the original collection is tightly related to generalization bounds in the adversarial
settings, which has also been been the subject of several recent works (Attias et al., 2018; Montasser
et al., 2019; Yin et al., 2018).
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The following theorem, proved in Appendix A.2, states that if we gradually increase the complexity of
the collection and the number of samples together, the empirical estimate of concentration converges
to actual concentration, as long as several conditions hold. Theorem 3.5 and the techniques used in
its proof are inspired by the work of Scott & Nowak (2006) on learning minimum volume sets.
Theorem 3.5. Let {G(T )}T∈N be a family of subset collections defined over a space X . Let{
φT
}
T∈N and
{
φT
}
T∈N be two families of complexity penalty functions such that φ
T and φT
are complexity penalties for G(T ) and G(T ) respectively, for some  ≥ 0. Let {m(T )}T∈N and
{δ(T )}T∈N be a two series such that m(T ) ∈ N and δ(T ) ∈ [0, 1].
Consider a series of datasets {ST }T∈N, where ST consists of m(T ) i.i.d. samples from a measure µ
supported on X . Also let α ∈ [0, 1] be such that h is locally continuous w.r.t the second parameter at
point (µ, α, ,Pow(X )). If all the following hold,
1.
∑∞
T=1 φ
T
(
m(T ), δ(T )
)
<∞
2.
∑∞
T=1 φ
T

(
m(T ), δ(T )
)
<∞
3. limT→∞ δ(T ) = 0
4. limT→∞ h
(
µ, α, ,G(T )) = h(µ, α, )
then with probability 1, we have limT→∞ h
(
µˆST , α, ,G(T )
)
= h(µ, α, ).
Remark 3.6. In Theorem 3.5, the first two conditions restrict the growth rate for the complexity of
the collections. Namely, we need the complexity penalties φT (m(T ), δ(T )) and φT (m(T ), δ(T )) to
rapidly approach 0 as T → ∞, which means the complexity of G(T ) and G(T ) should grow at a
slow rate. The third condition requires that our generalization error goes to zero as we increase T .
Note that the complexity penalty is a decreasing function with respect to δ, which means condition 3
makes achieving the first two conditions harder. However, since the complexity penalty is a function
of both δ and sample size, we can still increase the sample size with a faster rate to satisfy the first two
conditions. Finally, the fourth condition requires our approximation error goes to 0 as we increase T .
Note that this condition holds for any family of collections of subsets that is a universal approximator
(e.g., decision trees or neural networks). However, in order for our theorem to hold, we also need all
the other conditions. In particular, we cannot use decision trees or neural networks as our collection
of subsets, because we do not know if there is a complexity penalty for them that satisfies condition 2.
3.1 Special Case of `∞
In this subsection, we show how to instantiate Theorem 3.5 for the case of `∞. Below, we introduce
a special collection of subsets characterized by complement of union of hyperrectangles:
Definition 3.7 (Complement of union of hyperrectangles). For any positive integer T , the collection
of subsets specified by complement of union of T n-dimensional hyperrectangles is defined as
CR(T, n) =
{
Rn \ ∪Tt=1Rect(u(t), r(t)) : ∀t ∈ [T ], (u(t), r(t)) ∈ Rn × Rn≥0
}
,
whereRect(u, r) = {x ∈ X : ∀j ∈ [n], |xj − uj | ≤ rj/2} denotes the hyperrectangle centered at
u with r representing the edge size vector. When n is free of context, we simply write CR(T ).
Recall that our goal is to find a subset E ∈ Rn such that E has measure at least α and the ∞-expansion
of E under `∞ has the minimum measure. To achieve this goal, we approximate the distribution µ
with an empirical distribution µˆS , and limit our search to the special collection CR(T ) (though our
goal is to find the minimum concentration around arbitrary subsets). Namely, what we find is still an
upper bound on the concentration function, and it is an upper bound that we know it converges the
actual value in the limit. Our problem thus becomes the following optimization task:
minimize
E∈CR(T )
µˆS(E∞) subject to µˆS(E) ≥ α. (2)
The following theorem provides the key to our empirical method by providing a convergence
guarantee. It states that if we increase the number of rectangles and the number of samples together
in a careful way, the solution to the problem using restricted sets converges to the true concentration.
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Theorem 3.8. Consider a nice metric probability space (Rn, µ, `∞). Let {ST }T∈N be a family of
datasets such that for all T ∈ N, ST contains at least T 4 i.i.d. samples from µ. For any ∞ ≥ 0
and α ∈ [0, 1], if h is locally continuous w.r.t the second parameter at point (µ, α, ∞), then with
probability 1 we get
lim
T→∞
h
(
µˆST , α, ∞, CR(T )
)
= h(µ, α, ∞).
Note that the size of ST is selected as T 4 to guarantee conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied in Theorem
3.5. In fact, we can tune the parameters more carefully to get T 2, instead of T 4, but the convergence
will be slower. See Appendix A.3 for the proof.
3.2 Special Case of `2
This subsection demonstrates how to apply Theorem 3.5 to the case of `2. The following definition
introduces the collection of subsets characterized by union of balls:
Definition 3.9 (Union of Balls). For any positive integer T , the collection of subsets specified by
union of T n-dimensional balls is defined as
B(T, n) =
{
∪Tt=1 Ball(u(t), r(t)) : ∀t ∈ [T ], (u(t), r(t)) ∈ Rn × Rn≥0
}
.
When n is free of context, we simply write B(T ).
By restricting our search to the collection of union of balls B(T ) and replacing the underlying
distribution µ with the empirical one µˆS , our problem becomes the following optimization task
minimize
E∈B(T )
µˆS(E2) subject to µˆS(E) ≥ α. (3)
Theorem 3.10, proven in Appendix A.4, guarantees that if we increase the number of balls and
samples together in a careful way, the solution to problem (3) converges to the true concentration.
Theorem 3.10. Consider a nice metric probability space (Rn, µ, `2). Let {ST }T∈N be a family of
datasets such that for all T ∈ N, ST contains at least T 4 i.i.d. samples from µ. For any 2 ≥ 0
and α ∈ [0, 1], if h is locally continuous w.r.t the second parameter at point (µ, α, 2), then with
probability 1 we get
lim
T→∞
h
(
µˆST , α, 2,B(T )
)
= h(µ, α, 2).
4 Experiments
In this section, we provide heuristic methods to find the best possible error region, which covers
at least α fraction of the samples and its expansion covers the least number of points, for both
`∞ and `2 settings. Specifically, we first introduce our algorithm, then evaluate our approach on
benchmark image datasets: MNIST (LeCun et al., 2010), CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009),
Fashion-MNIST (Xiao et al., 2017) and SVHN (Netzer et al., 2011).
4.1 Experiments for `∞
Theorem 3.8 shows that the empirical concentration function h(µˆS , α, ∞, CR(T )) converges to the
actual concentration h(µ, α, ∞) asymptotically, when T and |S| go to infinity with |S| ≥ T 4. Thus,
to measure the concentration of µ, it remains to solve the optimization problem (2).
Method. Although the collection of subsets is specified using simple topology, solving (2) exactly is
still difficult, as the problem itself is combinatorial in nature. Borrowing techniques from clustering,
we propose an empirical method to search for desirable error region within CR(T ). Any error region
E could be used to define fE , i.e., fE(x) = f∗(x), if x /∈ E ; fE(x) 6= f∗(x), if x ∈ E . However,
finding a classifier corresponding to fE using a learning algorithm might be a very difficult task. Here,
we find the optimally robust error region, not the corresponding classifier. A desirable error region
should have small adversarial risk5, compared with all subsets in CR(T ) that have measure at least α.
5The adversarial risk of an error region E simply refers to the adversarial risk of fE .
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Figure 1: (a) Plots of risk and adversarial risk w.r.t. the resulted error region using our method as q
varies (CIFAR-10, ∞ = 8/255, T = 30); (b) Plots of adversarial risk w.r.t. the resulted error region
using our method (best q) as T varies on MNIST (∞ = 0.3) and CIFAR-10 (∞ = 8/255).
The high-level intuition is that images from different classes are likely to be concentrated in separable
regions, since it is generally believed that small perturbations preserve the ground-truth class at the
sampled images. Therefore, if we cluster all the images into different clusters, a desired region with
low adversarial risk should exclude any image from the dense clusters, otherwise the expansion of
such a region will quickly cover the whole cluster. In other words, a desirable subset within CR(T )
should be ∞ away (in `∞ norm) from all the dense image clusters, which motivates our method to
cover the dense image clusters using hyperrectangles and treat the complement of them as error set.
More specifically, our algorithm (for pseudocode, see Algorithm 1 in Appendix B) starts by sorting
all the training images in an ascending order based on the `1-norm distance to the k-th nearest
neighbour with k = 50, and then obtains T hyperrectangular image clusters by performing k-means
clustering (Hartigan & Wong, 1979) on the top-q densest images, where the metric is chosen as `1
and the maximum iterations is set as 30. Finally, we perform a binary search over q ∈ [0, 1], where
we set δbin = 0.005 as the stopping criteria, to obtain the best robust subset (lowest adversarial risk)
in CR(T ) with empirical measure at least α.
Results. We choose α to reflect the best accuracy achieved by state-of-the-art classifiers, using
α = 0.01 and ∞ ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4} for MNIST and selecting appropriate values to represent the
best typical results on the other datasets (see Table 1). Given the number of hyperrectangles, T , we
obtain the resulting error region using the proposed algorithm on the training dataset, and tune T for
the minimum adversarial risk on the testing dataset.
Figure 1 shows the training and testing curves regarding risk and adversarial risk for two specific ex-
perimental settings (similar results are obtained under other experimental settings, see Appendix C.1).
Figure 1(a) suggests that as we increase the initial covered percentage q, both risk and adversarial risk
of the corresponding error region decrease. This supports our use of binary search on q in Algorithm
1. On the other hand, as can be seen from Figure 1(b), overfitting with respect to adversarial risk
becomes significant as we increase the number of hyperrectangles. According to the adversarial risk
curve for testing data, the optimal value of T is selected as T = 10 for MNIST (∞ = 0.3) and
T = 40 for CIFAR-10 (∞ = 8/255).
Table 1 summarizes the optimal parameters, the empirical risk and adversarial risk of the corre-
sponding error region on both training and testing datasets for each experimental setting. Since
the k-means algorithm does not guarantee global optimum, we repeat our method for 10 runs with
random restarts in terms of the best parameters, then report both the mean and the standard deviation.
Our experiments provide examples of rather robust error regions for real image datasets. For instance,
in Table 1 we have a case where the measure of the resulting error region increases from 5.94%
to 18.13% after expansion with ∞ = 8/255 on CIFAR-10 dataset. This means that there could
potentially exist a classifier with 5.94% risk and 18.13% adversarial risk, but the-state-of-the-art
robust classifer (Madry et al., 2017) has empirically-measured adversarial risk 52.96% (see Table 2).
Noticing that the risk lower threshold α = 0.05 is much lower than the empirical risk 12.70%
of the adversarially-trained robust model reported in Madry et al. (2017), we further measure the
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Table 1: Summary of the main results using our method for different settings with `∞ perturbations.
Dataset α ∞ T Best q
Empirical Risk (%) Empirical AdvRisk (%)
training testing training testing
MNIST 0.01
0.1 5 0.662 1.22± 0.11 1.23± 0.12 3.65± 0.29 3.64± 0.30
0.2 10 0.660 1.12± 0.13 1.11± 0.10 5.76± 0.38 5.89± 0.44
0.3 10 0.629 1.12± 0.12 1.15± 0.13 7.34± 0.38 7.24± 0.38
0.4 10 0.598 1.15± 0.09 1.21± 0.09 9.89± 0.57 9.92± 0.60
CIFAR-10 0.05
2/255 10 0.680 5.32± 0.21 5.72± 0.25 7.29± 0.20 8.13± 0.26
4/255 20 0.688 5.59± 0.25 6.05± 0.40 11.43± 0.24 13.66± 0.33
8/255 40 0.734 5.55± 0.21 5.94± 0.34 13.69± 0.19 18.13± 0.30
16/255 75 0.719 5.16± 0.25 5.28± 0.23 19.77± 0.22 28.83± 0.46
Fashion-
MNIST
0.05
0.1 10 0.758 5.64± 0.78 5.92± 0.85 10.30± 0.72 11.56± 0.84
0.2 10 0.726 5.79± 1.00 6.00± 1.02 13.44± 0.60 14.82± 0.71
0.3 10 0.668 5.90± 0.94 6.13± 0.93 17.46± 0.53 18.87± 0.66
SVHN 0.05
0.01 10 0.812 5.21± 0.19 8.83± 0.30 6.08± 0.20 10.17± 0.29
0.02 10 0.773 5.31± 0.12 8.86± 0.20 7.76± 0.12 12.46± 0.15
0.03 10 0.750 5.15± 0.13 8.55± 0.22 8.88± 0.13 13.82± 0.25
Table 2: Comparisons between our method and the existing adversarially trained robust classifiers
under different settings. We use the Risk and AdvRisk for robust training methods to denote the
standard test error and attack success rate reported in literature. The AdvRisk reported for our method
can be seen as an estimated lower bound of adversarial risk for existing classifiers.
Dataset Strength (metric) Method Empirical Risk Empirical AdvRisk
MNIST ∞ = 0.3
Madry et al. (2017) 1.20% 10.70%
Ours (T = 10, α = 0.012) 1.35%± 0.08% 8.28%± 0.22%
MNIST 2 = 1.5
Schott et al. (2019) 1.00% 20.00%
Ours (T = 20, α = 0.01) 1.08% 2.12%
CIFAR-10 ∞ = 8/255
Madry et al. (2017) 12.70% 52.96%
Ours (T = 40, α = 0.127) 14.22%± 0.46% 29.21%± 0.35%
empirical concentration on MNIST and CIFAR-10 using our method as shown in Table 2, with α
set to be the same as the reported standard test error in Madry et al. (2017). We show that the gap
between the attack success rate of Madry’s classifier (10.70%) and our estimated best-achievable
adversarial risk (8.28%) is quite small on MNIST, suggesting that the robustness of Madry’s classifier
is actually close to the intrinsic robustness. In sharp contrast, the gap becomes significantly larger on
CIFAR-10: 29.21% for our estimate, while 52.96% for the reported attack success rate in Madry et al.
(2017). Regardless of the difference, this gap cannot be explained by the concentration of measure
phenomenon, showing that there may still be room for developing more robust classifiers.
4.2 Experiments for `2
For `2 adversaries, Theorem 3.10 guarantees the asymptotic convergence of the empirical concentra-
tion function characterized by union of balls B(T ) towards the actual concentration. Thus, it remains
to solve the corresponding optimization problem (3). Similar to `∞, we propose an empirical method
to search for desirable robust error regions under `2 perturbations. From a high level, our algorithm
(for pseudocode, see Algorithm 2 in Appendix B) places T balls in a sequential manner, and searches
for the best possible placement using a greedy approach at each time. Since enumerating all the
possible ball centers is infeasible, we restrict the choice of the center to be the set of training data
points. Our method keeps two sets of indices: one for the initial coverage and one for the coverage
after expansion, and updates them when we find the optimal placement, i.e. the ball centered at some
training data point that has the minimum expansion with respect to both sets.
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Table 3: Comparisons between different methods for finding robust error region with `2 perturbations.
Dataset α 2
Gilmer et al. (2018b) Our Method
Risk AdvRisk T Risk AdvRisk
MNIST 0.01
1.58 1.18% 3.92% 20 1.07% 2.19%
3.16 1.18% 9.73% 20 1.02% 4.15%
4.74 1.18% 23.40% 20 1.07% 10.09%
CIFAR-10 0.05
0.2453 5.27% 5.58% 5 5.16% 5.53%
0.4905 5.27% 5.93% 5 5.14% 5.83%
0.9810 5.27% 6.47% 5 5.12% 6.56%
Fashion-
MNIST
0.01
1.58 5.09% 12.75% 10 5.07% 7.77%
3.16 5.09% 21.54% 10 4.99% 16.23%
4.74 5.09% 30.04% 10 5.21% 20.10%
SVHN 0.05
0.3127 7.69% 7.99% 10 6.92% 7.34%
0.6254 7.69% 8.39% 10 7.30% 8.16%
0.9810 7.69% 8.79% 10 7.56% 8.94%
We compare our empirical method for finding robust error regions characterized by a union of balls
with the hyperplane-based approach (Gilmer et al., 2018b) on benchmark datasets. In particular, the
risk threshold α is set to be the same as the case of `∞, and the adversarial strength 2 is chosen
such that the volume of an `2 ball with radius 2 is roughly the same as the `∞ ball with radius ∞,
using the conversion rule 2 =
√
n/pi · ∞ as in Wong et al. (2018). Table 3 summarizes the optimal
parameters, the testing risk and adversarial risk (see Appendix C.2 for more detailed results) of the
trained error regions using different methods, where we tune the number of balls T for our method.
Our results show that there exist rather robust `2 error regions for real image datasets. For example,
the measure of the resulting error region using our method only increases by 0.69% (from 5.14% to
5.83%) after expansion with 2 = 0.4905 on CIFAR-10. Compared with Gilmer et al. (2018b), our
method is able to find regions with significantly smaller adversarial risk (around half the adversarial
risk of regions found by their method) on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, while attaining comparable
error region robustness on CIFAR-10 and SVHN. Nevertheless, the adversarial risk attained by
state-of-the-art robust classifiers against `2 perturbations is much higher than these reported rates
(see Table 2 for a comparison with one of the current best robust classifiers against `2 perturbations
proposed in Schott et al. (2019)).
5 Conclusion
To understand whether theoretical results showing limits of intrinsic robustness for natural distribu-
tions apply to concrete datasets, we developed a general framework to measure the concentration
of an unknown distribution through its i.i.d. samples and a carefully-selected collection of subsets.
Our experimental results suggest that the concentration of measure phenomenon is not the sole
reason behind vulnerability of the existing classifiers to adversarial examples. In other words, the
impossibility results of (Gilmer et al., 2018b; Fawzi et al., 2018; Mahloujifar et al., 2018; Shafahi
et al., 2018), should not make the community hopeless in finding better robust classifiers.
Availability
Our implementation, including code for reproducing all our experiments, is available as open source
code at https://github.com/xiaozhanguva/Measure-Concentration.
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A Proofs of Theorems in Section 3
In this section, we prove Theorems 3.3, 3.5, 3.8 and 3.10.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. Define g(µ, α, ,G) = argminE∈G {µ(E) : µ(E) ≥ α}, and let E = g(µ, α + δ, ,G) and
Eˆ = g(µˆS , α, ,G). (Note that these sets achieving the minimum might not exist, in which case we
select a set for which the expansion is arbitrarily close to the infimum and every step of the proof will
extend to this variant).
By the definition of the complexity penalty we have
Pr
S←µm
[∣∣∣µ(Eˆ)− µˆS(Eˆ)∣∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ φ(m, δ)
which implies
Pr
S←µm
[µ(Eˆ) ≤ α− δ] ≤ φ(m, δ).
Therefore, by the definition of h we have
Pr
S←µm
[µ(Eˆ) ≤ h(µ, α− δ, ,G)] ≤ φ(m, δ). (4)
On the other hand, based on the definition of φ we have
Pr
S←µm
[∣∣∣µ(Eˆ)− µˆS(Eˆ)∣∣∣ ≥ δ] ≤ φ(m, δ). (5)
Combining Equation 4 and Equation 5, and by a union bound we get
Pr
S←µm
[µˆS(Eˆ) ≤ h(µ, α− δ, ,G)− δ] ≤ φ(m, δ) + φ(m, δ)
which by the definition of Eˆ implies that
Pr
S←µm
[h(µˆS , α, ,G) ≤ h(µ, α− δ, ,G)− δ] ≤ φ(m, δ) + φ(m, δ). (6)
Now we bound the probability for the other side of our inequality. By the definition of the notion of
complexity penalty we have
Pr
S←µm
[|µ(E)− µˆS(E)| ≥ δ] ≤ φ(m, δ)
which implies
Pr
S←µm
[µˆS(E) ≤ α] ≤ φ(m, δ).
Therefore, by the definition of h we have,
Pr
S←µm
[µˆS(E) ≤ h(µˆS , α, ,G)] ≤ φ(m, δ). (7)
On the other hand, based on the definition of φ we have
Pr
S←µm
[|µ(E)− µˆS(E)| ≥ δ] ≤ φ(m, δ) + φ(m, δ). (8)
Combining Equations 7 and 8, by union bound we get
Pr
S←µm
[µ(E) ≤ h(µˆS , α, ,G)− δ] ≤ φ(m, δ) + φ(m, δ)
which by the definition of E implies
Pr
S←µm
[h(µ, α+ δ, ,G) ≤ h(µˆS , α, ,G)− δ] ≤ φ(m, δ) + φ(m, δ). (9)
Now combining Equations 6 and 9, by union bound we have
Pr
S←µm
[h(µ, α−δ, ,G)−δ ≤ h(µˆS , α, ,G) ≤ h(µ, α+δ, ,G)+δ] ≥ 1−2 (φ(m, δ) + φ(m, δ)) .
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.5
In this section, we prove Theorem 3.5 using ideas similar to ideas used in Scott & Nowak (2006).
Before proving the theorem, we lay out the following lemma which will be used in the proof.
Lemma A.1 (Borel-Cantelli Lemma). Let {ET }T∈N be a series of events such that
∞∑
T=1
Pr[ET ] <∞
Then with probability 1, only finite number of events will occur.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3.5.
Proof of Theorem 3.5. Define ET to be the event that
h(µ, α−δ(T ), ,G(T ))−δ(T ) > h(µˆST , α, ) or h(µ, α+δ(T ), ,G(T ))+δ(T ) < h(µˆST , α, ,G).
Based on Theorem 3.3 we have Pr[ET ] ≤ 2 · (φT (m(T ), δ(T )) + φT (m(T ), δ(T ))). Therefore, by
Conditions 1 and 2 we have
∞∑
T=1
Pr[ET ] ≤ 2
( ∞∑
T=1
φT (m(T ), δ(T )) + φT (m(T ), δ(T ))
)
<∞.
Now by Lemma A.1, we know there exist with measure 1 some j ∈ N, such that for all T ≥ j,
h(µ, α− δ(T ), ,G(T ))− δ(T ) ≤ h(µˆST , α, ,G(T )) ≤ h(µ, α+ δ(T ), ,G(T )) + δ(T ).
The above implies that
lim
T→∞
h(µ, α−δ(T ), ,G(T ))−δ(T ) ≤ lim
T→∞
h(µˆST , α, ,G(T )) ≤ lim
T→∞
h(µ, α+δ(T ), ,G(T ))+δ(T ).
We know that
lim
T→∞
h(µ, α− δ(T ), ,G(T )) = lim
T1→∞
lim
T2→∞
h(µ, α− δ(T1), ,G(T2))
(By condition 4) = lim
T1→∞
h(µ, α− δ(T1), )
(By local continuity and condition 3) = h(µ, α, ).
Similarly, we have
lim
T→∞
h(µ, α+ δ(T ), ,G(T )) = h(µ, α, ).
Therefore we have,
lim
T→∞
h(µ, α, )− δ(T ) ≤ lim
T→∞
h(µˆST , α, ,G(T )) ≤ lim
T→∞
h(µ, α, ) + δ(T )
which by condition 3 implies
lim
T→∞
h(µˆST , α, ,G(T )) = h(µ, α, ).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3.8
Proof. This theorem follows from our general Theorem 3.5. We show that the choice of parameters
here satisfies all four conditions of Theorem 3.5.
If we let G(T ) to be the collection of subsets specified by complement of union of T hyperrectangles.
Then G(T ) will be the collection of of subsets specified by complement of union of T hyperrectangles
that are bigger than  in each coordinate. Therefore we have G(T ) ⊂ G(T ). We know that the VC
dimension of G(T ) is dT = O(nT log(T )) because the VC dimension of all hyperrectangles is O(n)
and the functions formed by T fold union of functions in a VC class is at most n · T log(T ) (See
Eisenstat & Angluin (2007)). Therefore, by VC inequality we have
Pr
S←µm
[
sup
E∈G(T )
|µ(E)− µˆS(E)| ≥ δ
]
≤ 8enT log(T ) log(m)−mδ2/128.
Therefore ΦT (m, δ) = 8enT log(T ) log(m)−mδ
2/128 is a complexity penalty for both G(T ) and G(T ).
Hence, if we define δ(T ) = 1/T and m(T ) ≥ T 4, then the first three conditions of Theorem 3.5 are
satisfied. The fourth condition is also satisfied by the universal consistency of histogram rules (See
Devroye et al. (2013), Ch. 9).
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.10
Proof. Similar to Theorem 3.8 This theorem follows from our general Theorem 3.5. We show that
the choice of parameters here satisfies all four conditions of Theorem 3.5.
If we let G(T ) to be the collection of subsets specified by union of T balls. Then G(T ) will be the
collection of of subsets specified by union of T balls with diameter at least . Similar to the proof of
Theorem 3.8, we have G(T ) ⊂ G(T ). We know that the VC dimension of all balls is O(n) so using
the fact that G(T ) is T fold union of balls, the VC dimension of G(T ) is dT = O(nT log(T )) (See
Eisenstat & Angluin (2007)). Therefore, by VC inequality we have complexity penalties similar to
those of Theorem 3.8 for both G(T ) and G(T ). Hence, if we define δ(T ) = 1/T and m(T ) ≥ T 4,
then the first three conditions of Theorem 3.5 are satisfied. The fourth condition is also satisfied by
the universal consistency of kernel-based rules (See Devroye et al. (2013) , Ch. 10).
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B Algorithms
This section provides pseudocode for our algorithms for finding robust error regions under `∞ and `2.
Algorithm 1: Heuristic Search for Robust Error Region under `∞
Input :a set of images S; perturbation strength ∞; error threshold α; number of hyperrectangles
T ; number of nearest neighbours k; precision for binary search δbin.
1 rk(x)← compute the `1-norm distance to the k-th nearest neighbour for each x ∈ S;
2 Ssort ← sort all the images in S by rk(x) in an ascending order;
3 qlower ← 0.0, qupper ← 1.0;
4 while qupper − qlower > δbin do
5 q ← (qlower + qupper)/2;
6 perform kmeans clustering algorithm (T clusters, `1 metric) on the top-q images of Ssort;
7 {u(t)}Tt=1 ← record the centroids of the resulted T clusters;
8 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
9 Rect(u(t), r(t))← cover t-th cluster with the minimum-sized rectangle centered at u(t);
10 end
11 Eq ← X \ ∪Tt=1Rect∞(u(t), r(t)) ; // Rect(u, r) denotes the -expansion ofRect(u, r)
12 if |S ∩ Eq|/|S| ≥ α then
13 qlower ← q, AdvRiskq ←
∣∣{x ∈ S : x 6∈ ∪Tt=1Rect(u(t), r(t))}∣∣/|S|;
14 else
15 qupper ← q;
16 end
17 end
18 qˆ ← argminq{AdvRiskq};
Output : (qˆ, AdvRiskqˆ , Eqˆ)
Algorithm 2: Heuristic Search for Robust Error Region under `2
Input :a set of images S; perturbation strength 2; error threshold α; number of balls T .
1 Eˆ ← {}, Sˆinit ← {}, Sˆexp ← {};
2 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T do
3 klower ← d(α|S| − |Sˆinit|)/(T − t+ 1)e, kupper ← (α|S| − |Sˆinit|);
4 for u ∈ S do
5 for k ∈ [klower, kupper] do
6 rk(u)← compute the `2 distance from u to the k-th nearest neighbour in S \ Sˆinit;
7 Sinit(u, k)← {x ∈ S \ Sˆinit : ‖x− u‖2 ≤ rk(u)};
8 Sexp(u, k)← {x ∈ S \ Sˆexp : ‖x− u‖2 ≤ rk(u) + 2};
9 end
10 end
11 (uˆ, kˆ)← argmin(u,k){|Sexp(u, k)| − |Sinit(u, k)|};
12 Eˆ ← Eˆ ∪ Ball(uˆ, rkˆ(uˆ));
13 Sˆinit ← Sˆinit ∪ Sinit(uˆ, kˆ), Sˆexp ← Sˆexp ∪ Sexp(uˆ, kˆ);
14 end
Output : Eˆ
15
C Other Experimental Results
C.1 Additional learning curves
We provide additional training and testing curves regarding risk and adversarial risk for different
experimental settings under `∞ perturbations in this section.
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(a) MNIST (∞ = 0.1 and T = 10)
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(b) MNIST (∞ = 0.3 and T = 10)
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(c) CIFAR-10 (∞ = 4/255 and T = 20)
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(d) CIFAR-10 (∞ = 8/255 and T = 40)
Figure 2: Risk and adversarial risk of the corresponding region as q varies under different settings.
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Figure 3: Adversarial risk of the resulted error region with best q obtained using our method as
T varies under different settings: (a) MNIST ( = 0.1, α = 0.01) and CIFAR-10 (∞ = 2/255,
α = 0.05); (b) MNIST (∞ = 0.2, α = 0.01) and CIFAR-10 (∞ = 4/255, α = 0.05)
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C.2 Detailed results for `2 using our method
This section demonstrates the detailed training and testing results on the best error region obtained
using Algorithm 2 on the considered benchmark image datasets.
Table 4: Summary of the main results using our method for different settings with `2 perturbations.
Dataset α 2 T
Empirical Risk Empirical AdvRisk
training testing training testing
MNIST 0.01
1.58 20 1.25% 1.07% 2.23% 2.19%
3.16 20 1.25% 1.02% 4.35% 4.15%
4.74 20 1.25% 1.07% 10.71% 10.09%
CIFAR-10 0.05
0.2453 5 5.00% 5.16% 5.22% 5.53%
0.4905 5 5.00% 5.14% 5.61% 5.83%
0.9810 5 5.00% 5.12% 6.38% 6.56%
Fashion-
MNIST
0.05
1.58 10 5.25% 5.07% 7.84% 7.77%
3.16 10 5.25% 4.99% 15.95% 16.23%
4.74 10 5.25% 5.21% 19.76% 20.10%
SVHN 0.05
0.3127 10 5.00% 6.92% 5.24% 7.34%
0.6254 10 5.00% 7.30% 5.59% 8.16%
0.9381 10 5.00% 7.56% 5.96% 8.94%
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